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THE NEED FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
by STEPHANOS BmAs* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When scholars discuss prosecutorial discretion, they often treat it as a 
regrettable concession to reality. American criminal court dockets are chronically 
congested, so prosecutors must use discretion to plea bargain away most of their 
cases. 1 Legislatures, as William Stuntz has argued, have strong political incentive 
to pass overbroad and overlapping criminal statutes instead of drawing them so 
narrowly that some scoundrels might escape.2 Admittedly, these broad and 
overlapping criminal laws let police and prosecutors decide who actually deserves 
to be charged and with what crimes. 3 For instance, police may ignore most 
automobile drivers who go over the sixty-five mile-per-hour speed limit, stopping 
only those who go at least eighty. Or they might pull over only black drivers as a 
pretext to search for drugs. For their part, prosecutors can decline to charge 
entirely, citing their workloads, and leave enforcement to potential civil suits.4 Or, 
prosecutors can charge crimes they would not normally pursue to trial as a way of 
racking up plea bargaining chips or pressing a small fry to cooperate against the big 
fish. Sentencing laws likewise give prosecutors enormous discretion to recommend 
high or low punishments, diversion to drug treatment, or deals in exchange for 
cooperation against other defendants. 5 In a world of scarcity, prosecutors are the 
key gatekeepers who ration criminal justice. 
Is prosecutorial discretion, then, simply a regrettable artifact of scarcity? If our 
dockets were spacious and our prisons capacious, would we do away with 
prosecutorial discretion entirely? No. True, even some modem countries with busy 
dockets abjure American-style prosecutorial discretion. In Germany and elsewhere 
in continental Europe, prosecutors are supposed to charge and prosecute all 
defendants for whom they have enough evidence of guilt.6 A few American states, 
*Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1. Mll.TON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES. AND 
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 1 (U. Chi. Press 1978). 
2. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505. 529-
33 (2001) (explaining that legislators want to stay in office, requiring them to please their constituents, 
including prosecutors, resulting in gain when they write criminal statutes to benefit prosecutors). 
3. /d. at 549. 
4. /d. at 535. 
5. See Alben W. Alschuler, Sentencing Refonn and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent 
Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 550 (1978) (noting that 
prosecutors have a greater influence on sentencing than other governmental decision makers). 
6. See StrafprozeBordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Dec. 9, 1975, Bundesgesetzblatt 
[BGBl] 631, as amended,§ 152(2) (requiring prosecutors to act against all crimes for which they have a 
[369] 
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including West Virginia, purport to require prosecutors to pursue charges. 7 And 
victims' right~ advocates occasionally suggc~t that all victims should be able to 
bring case~ when prosecutors do not, as a few states allow.11 
While the press of business and the welter of statutes exacerbate the need for 
prosccutorial discretion, they do not create it. Even in a world of unlimited 
resources and sane criminal codes, discretion would be essential to doing justice. 
Justice requires not only rules but also fine -grained moral evaluations and 
distinctions. Judges and juries should make more of these judgment calls than they 
do now, but prosecutors also deserve large roles. 
Consider an actual example that epitomizes the problems of law without 
prosecutorial discretion: a grandmother in Delaware sent her granddaughter to her 
third-grade class with a birthday cake and a knife with which to cut it.9 The teacher 
ust!d the knife to cut and serve the cake, but then called the principal's office to 
report the girl for bringing a weapon to school. 10 The school district had a zero-
tolerance policy for weapons (to avoid accusations of discriminatory enforcement) 
so it had no choice but to expel the girl for a year. 11 After a public outcry, Delaware 
legislators passed a law giving administrators some case-by-case flexibility to 
modify expulsions from school.U The next year, Delaware first-grader Zachary 
Christie, excited about joining the Cub Scouts, brought his camping combination 
fork, spoon, and knife to use at lunch.' 3 Zachary had violated the school's zero-
tolerance policy for weapons, so it had to suspend him for forty-five days. 1-' The 
board had no choice but to suspend Zachary, since the new law created flexibility 
only for expulsions. 15 Because these rigid laws left too little room for enforcement 
discretion, they produced absurdly unjust results. 
ln this Symposium Essay, I want to diMinguish discretion per se from 
idiosyncratic discretion. Discretion per se is neither bad nor antithetical to the rule 
of law. We often equate the rule of law with rigid rules, emphasizing the need to 
treat like c~es alike. But the tlip side of rigid rules is discretion in applying them 
where they do not quite fit. The flip side of treating like cases alike is treating 
unlike cases unlike. By their nature, rules cannot capture every subtlety, which is 
why various actors need discretion to tailor their application of the law. More of 
~> Ufticic:nt tactual basis): Co:,r. [Con~titutionl :ut. 11:! (llaly) ("The public prosc:cutor has lhe duty to 
msutul~ L:liminal proceeding~ . ' ' ). 
7. See W.VA. Com:: ANN. § 7-4-1 (Le>..isNexis 2009) (specifying lhat each county prosecutor, 
aller n.:cc:1ving information of a crime in lhc county, "shall institute and prosecute all neces~ary and 
pwpcr proceedings againstlhe offender . .. . "). 
K Se(' WIS. STAT. ANN. § 96!W2(3) (We~t 2009) (allowmg a private party. after court approval. to 
i!oo ~>Uc a crinunal complaint 1f a district attorney i:. unavailable or refuses to do so): W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
41:!-27-'}02 laulhorizing coun-approvcd pnvate complaints for domestic viOlence). 
q _ Ian Urbina, lt'J. a Fork, It's a Spoon. It's a . . . Weapon? School Suspends Boy, 6 , N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct 12. 2009. at AI , available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12'educationll2disclpline.html. 
10. Jd. 
II. /d. 
12. I d. 
13. I d. 
14. /d. 
15. /d. 
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that discretion should reside in the hands of police, judges, juries, and pardon 
authorities. But much of it rightly belongs to prosecutors. What we should fear is 
not prosecutorial discretion but idiosyncratic prosecutorial discretion. We rightly 
fear that justice will vary from prosecutor to prosecutor, with each one a law unto 
himself and his· QWn whims, biases, and shirking. The solution, then, is to create a 
culture, structures, and incentives within prosecutors' offices so that prosecutors 
use their discretion consistently and in accord with the public's sense of justice. In 
moderation, judicious discretion promotes justice; promiscuous, idiosyncratic 
discretion violates it. 
II. RULES CANNOT FuLLY CAPTURE JUSTICE 
As Justice Scalia famously put it, we think of "[t)he rule of law as a law of 
rules."16 Rules should be clear, general, stable, announced in advance, applied 
prospectively and consistently, and capable of being followed. A legal system that 
approaches this ideal, Lon Fuller argued, has its own internal morality. 17 People can 
learn what the law requires of them and conform to it, and the legal system has to 
play by its own rules. In first-year criminal law courses, we often stress the 
principle of legality, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and the ban 
on ex post facto laws. 111 These doctrines serve a cluster of functions. In theory, they 
give citizens notice and fair warning of what conduct will expose them to 
punishment. But that justitication is largely a fiction; few citizens sit around 
reading the precise terms of the latest criminal statutes. Instead, they rely on their 
own intuitive sense of justice as to what seems right and wrong and often assume 
that the law tracks their intuitions. 
More realistically, legality doctrines are supposed to constrain official 
discretion. Police and prosecutors should not have free rein to decide what conduct 
to criminalize and how severely to punish it. Democratically elected legislatures 
can better reflect the public's sense of justice, sorting the most blameworthy and 
harmful acts from those that do not deserve punishment. Ultimately, the legality 
doctrines are about the separation of powers. 19 
First-year law students are tempted to find all kinds of criminal laws too 
vague. They soon learn, however, that courts do not require every criminal law to 
be as precise and narrowly tailored as possible, unless perhaps it intrudes on First 
Amendment freedoms. 20 Legislatures have great leeway to write broad laws and 
16. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1175 (1989). 
17. See l.oN L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (Yale U. Press 1964)(describing how the inner 
morality of the law demands that it be coherent and clear). 
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 3 (forbidding Congress to enact ex post facto laws); U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (applying same prohibition to states); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 
156, 156 (1972) (striking down vagrancy ordinance as unconstitutionally vague). 
19. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 
VA. L. REv. 189, 189 (1985) (describing how the principles of legality interact). 
20. See David J. Bedennan, Scott M. Christensen, & Scott Dean Quesenberry, Of Banana Bills and 
Veggie Hate Crime~·: The Constitutionality of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes. 34 HARv. J. ON 
LEGIS. 135, 164 (1997) ('The Supreme Court of thc:: United States has recognized that First Amendment 
protections of the freedom of speech are important and deserving of heightened protection.''). 
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delegate enforcement discretion to police, judges, juries, parole boards, and 
especially prosecutors. Sometimes, they want to give prosecutors plea bargaining 
chips. Sometimes, they cannot be bothered to write their laws with care. 
Enforcement leeway is most troubling when it lets prosecutors push the 
envelope and expand liability under vague statutes. Far more central to 
prosecutorial discretion, however, is the power to narrow liability by choosing not 
to enforce the law or seek the maximum penalty. Sometimes prosecutors simply 
lack enough evidence to produce a conviction at trial; at other times, they face a 
real risk of acquittal. In these cru,es, discretion is often the better part of valor, and a 
plea to a lesser charge is better than no conviction at all. In many other cases, 
prosecutors have a defendant dead to rights, but application of the law would not 
always seem just. Does a husband who kills his terminally ill wife after she begs 
him to do so deserve a first-degree murder conviction and life sentence? Does a 
mentally retarded teenager who uses a water pistol to stick up a convenience store 
deserve a standard sentence for armed robbery? 
These kinds of cases are far from unimaginable, as the zero-tolerance 
examples in the Introduction demonstrate. These examples of law without 
discretion prove Mr. Bumble's complaint that "the law is a ass-a idiot [sic]," and 
Grant Gilmore's that "[i]n Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will 
be meticulously observed."21 To many, the cure for discrimination would be worse 
than the disease. Mechanical rules without humanity grow inhuman and insane. 
These cases illustrate that no criminal code can spell out crimes and 
punishments to fit every conceivable scenario. The most they can hope to do is to 
specify crimes and sentences for common, recurring cases and some of their 
permutations. A legislature or sentencing commission can reasonably anticipate the 
use of a weapon, or injury to victims, or the amount of money or drugs involved. 
Yet, whatever the legislature does not address, it implicitly delegates to prosecutors 
and other criminal justice actors.22 It is a kind of Chevron inquiry, allowing 
prosecutors reasonable leeway to implement legislative commands.23 While in an 
ideal world, judges, juries, and pardon authorities would do more of the work to 
tailor charges and punishments, plenty of work would remain for prosecutors. 
A technically guilty but morally sympathetic mentally retarded defendant 
should not have to endure prosecution in the fust place for a nonviolent crime. No 
system of law can address these cases without some discretion at early stages to 
give the system needed flexibility. Furthermore, these hypothetical situations track 
the popular moral intuition that we generally want to pursue justice tempered by 
mercy. Individualized justice and mercy both require a human being, not a robot or 
guidelines manual, to review cases. Most cases deserve standard treatment, but 
exceptional cases deserve exceptions. 
Discretion is bad only when it becomes idiosyncratic, unaccountable, or 
opaque. Prosecutorial discretion is on much frrmer ground when it tracks widely 
21. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TwiST 354 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Oxford U. Press 1966) (1838); 
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (Yale U. Press 1977). 
22. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 546-57 (describing the relationship between legislators and 
prosecutors in the context of prosecutoriaJ discretion). 
23. ld. 
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shared moral intuitions. These moral intuitions not only warn prospective criminals 
but also give prosecutors' decisions some democratic legitimacy. What is troubling 
about prosecutorial discretion is not that it places discretionary power in the hands 
of individuals. What is troubling is that it is very often ad hoc, hidden, and 
insulated from public scrutiny and criticism. Many discretionary decisions require 
no reasoned justification. 24 These decisions risk being inconsistent, biased, and 
tainted by agency costs that pull them far from the public's shared moral sense. 
III. HOW TO IMPROVE PR.OSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
If we could bring these decisions out into the open, the public would be in a 
position to judge their fairness. Most head prosecutors are elected. To win re-
election, they have strong incentives to track popular moral intuitions.25 The first 
step, then, is to make discretion transparent. This would not mean opening every 
confidential file to public scrutiny, thereby violating defendants' and victims' 
privacy. But it does mean publishing better statistics about initial charges, final 
charges, recommended sentences, and reasons for charges, plea bargains, sentences, 
and related deals. Information technology can make these data more accessible to 
researchers and the public. For example, Marc Miller and Ronald Wright have 
mined the New Orleans District Attorney's Office data to summarize the reasons 
for prosecutorial declinations and charges. 26 They found patterns showing that most 
discretionary decisions follow a sort of office common law, that is, habits and 
patterns of disposition that treat like cases alike. 27 In other words, even though 
outside observers see only a black box with no evident law, insiders recognize 
norms and customs that yield predictable results. 28 
Opening the black box can help to make prosecutors' decisions more 
legitimate in the eyes of the public as well as ferret out suspicious patterns that 
might reflect bias or sloth. Opening the black box would also invite more public 
input, helping to refine patterns of discretion to better track the public's shared 
sense of justice. 29 The shared sense of justice is contextual, so this process of 
refining discretion can make justice more reasoned and reasonable than any set of 
rules alone could. 
Head prosecutors care about their reputations and often face re-election, so 
they will encourage line prosecutors to follow the public's shared sense of justice. 
An office-wide culture of guided discretion thus begins with head prosecutors, who 
lead by their rhetoric and by example. This comes into play in hiring, promotion, 
24. See id. at 549 ("Criminal statutes are a grant of power to police and prosecutors, who can choose 
how aggressively and in what cases to exercise that power."). 
25. /d. at 533. 
26. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129 (2008). 
27. See id. at 133-54 (describing and analyzing the reasons for prosecutorial decisions in the New 
Orleans District Attorney's Office). 
28. See id. at 151-52 (noting that the likelihood of a prosecutor bringing charges directly tracks the 
seriousness of the given crime). 
29. See id. at 181-96 (discussing the concept of transparency or the notion that the public should 
have greater access to reasons for prosecutorial decisions). 
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and firing, where supervisors can try to ferret out candidates who seem prone to 
going off on their own. 30 It should influence salary raises, bonuses, and incentives, 
rewarding consistency tempered by suitable mercy. Office-wide policies should try 
to summarize the norms for certain recurring types of cases and illustrations of 
exceptional cases. These policies could develop through a common-law accretion 
of precedent, so that newer attorneys could read the accumulated wisdom of their 
predecessors. Even if these policies were only advisory, they would serve as 
benchmarks and mental anchors, reining in outliers by making line prosecutors 
justify their decisions. Eventually, illustrations could develop into standards, and 
standards could develop into rules. 31 
In the academy, we have a strong judiciocentric bias. We assume that if a rule 
is not judicially enforceable, it is meaningless. 32 Miller and Wright show, however, 
that internal prosecutorial norms can develop and consistently shape prosecutors' 
behavior without any judicial involvement. 33 The influence of office culture, 
backed up by the disciplining effect of voters' expectations, can give these norms 
and rules great power. ~4 
In other words, discretion is far from lawless or arbitrary. When used 
judiciously, it can deliver consistent and tailored results. What we need to watch 
out for in practice, then, are the forces that push prosecutorial discretion in the 
wrong direction, away from the public's sense of justice. 
The most troubling forces working against justice are agency costs. The press 
of business pushes prosecutors to use their discretion to coerce pleas and threaten 
higher punishments for those who refuse to bargain. Even when the pressure of 
cases is not overwhelming, Milton Heumann argues, lawyers expect that cases 
should routinely plead out, and they use their leverage to push for pleas.35 Far from 
being a concession to reality, prosecutorial discretion would probably work even 
better in an ideal world without entrenched habits of plea bargaining. Without the 
practical press of business, prosecutors would be freer to exercise discretion to suit 
justice. The trick, then, is not to abolish discretion but to counteract the agency 
costs that in practice drive a wedge between discretion and justice. 
The best way to keep discretion from becoming idiosyncratic ~s to encourage 
prosecutors to develop patterns and habits and then justify deviations from those 
habits. Judges have some discretion, but they must justify their rulings with 
reasoned, written opinions subject to appellate review and public scrutiny. 
Prosecutors likewise should have to develop patterns that evolve into guidelines 
30. S11e StunlL., :;upra note 2, ar 533 t''Lik~: legislato~. local prosecutors are likely to seek to produce 
the range of outcomes the public desires."). 
3l. Richard S. Frase, I11e Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of 
Prusecuturial Discretion. 41 U. CHI. L REV. 246, 294 (1980). 
32. Su Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Nomu: Agenry Statutory lmerpretation as an 
r\uwnomous Enterp1i~·e, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 500-01 (:!005) (discussing the limitations of rules-
fol:u:.ed academic legal interpretation). 
33. See :;upra text accompanying no~s 26-29 (discussing reasons for certain prosecutorial 
dc:dsions). 
34. See Stun~. supra note 2, at 533 ( .. [Prosecuto~'l incentive is to genenlte the level and 
distribution of prosecutions the public wants, subject to the resource constraints of their office."). 
35. Ht::.UMANN, :;·upra note l, at 117. 
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and policies. Line prosecutors might have to explain briefly in writing why they 
decided not to offer the usual plea bargain to a particular defendant. Supervisors 
could scrutinize these memos, question line prosecutors, and second guess them. 
Importantly, supervisors do not share line prosecutors' acute interests in disposing 
of their own workloads and avoiding even a chance of an embarrassing acquittal. 
Thus, they cari correct for agency costs and keep line prosecutors in line. The mere 
fear of review would discipline outliers without preventing justifiable deviation. In 
other words, just decisions can and should bubble up from below, so long as 
higher-ups are there to review and harmonize them, to check for outliers. 
Ultimately, even in an ideal world, discretion would exist and serve justice. 
The misguided quest for rules without discretion, most visible in mandatory-
minimum sentences, misconceives justice. Justice is not some top-down scheme of 
perfectly filigreed rules, each with enough epicycles and perihelia to delight a 
Ptolemaic astronomer. Central planning, specified in advance, failed in Communist 
economies and fails in criminal justice. Justice has not only a deductive, top-down 
aspect but also an inductive, bottom-up one. From grassroots examples and 
comparisons across cases we recognize exceptions as well as patterns. Because 
justice necessarily has a case-by-case component, legislation must leave room for 
line officials' discretion in individual cases. In an ideal world, prosecutorial 
discretion would remain central to justice. 
